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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2013, the administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto launched the National Crime and 
Violence Prevention fund (PRONAPRED). From 2013 to 2016, Mexico designated around 
$771,145,021 dollars for crime prevention programs; later in 2017 no money where designated for 
this purpose. At the end of the Enrique Peña Nieto administration, in 2018, the program was 
relaunched, but the new budget was about 10 times less. Mass media and academics have heavily 
criticized the efficiency of the Fund operations and money allocation for crime prevention. The 
present study is designed to implement quantitative analysis for identifying the impact of the 
PRONAPRED fund in the intentional total homicides in Mexico. By using a fixed effect estimation 
for panel data, and controlling for several school variables (elementary, middle and high school), 
as well as an economic variable, such as the total number of new retail stores opened (used as a 
proxy variable for economic flow in the areas of interest). We found that the dummy variable for 
PRONAPRED is significant in each estimation. In other words, the PRONAPRED coefficient 
shows that municipalities that have received program funding have lower homicide rates as 
opposed to those not included in the program. Although political shocks, economic crisis and 
funding for fighting crime directly can be key factors affecting the crime rates, according with the 
data collected for this study the PRONAPRED fund has contributed in reducing intentional 
homicides in Mexico.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
The violence and different types of crime, including homicides, started to arise in many areas in 
Mexico after a controversial presidential election in July of 2006,1 where Felipe Calderon 
Hinojosa, the candidate of PAN (National Action Party), emerged as the winner. In December of 
2006, the new administration launched a war against Organized Crime (OC), traditionally known 
as Cartels. 
The strategy of the war included the following three goals: to recover the lost territory in the hands 
of OC, to reduce the production and the flow of illegal drugs into Mexico, and to finish with 
gravely detrimental crimes to Mexican society such as extortions and kidnappings, which are 
crimes typically attributed to OCs (Vilalta, 2013). Since then, Mexico has experimented an unusual 
wave of insecurity and violence where homicides captured the principal attention of the society.2 
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Merida Initiative (Iniciativa 
Merida), a package of U.S assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in 2008. 
During 2006 to 2012 the strategy of President Felipe Calderon was based mainly in the use of the 
Army and Marine in the national territory, federal police and bureau of investigation in 
"coordination" with local police, through joint operation against the drug traffic and production. 
This strategy was criticized for several sectors of the society for increasing the rate of violence and 
crime, mostly homicides across the country. 
1 The official margin of difference between Calderón and López Obrador of the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution)
was 0.58%. But there were massive irregularities that could affect the final output. (Weisbrot, 2012) 
2 According to Verisk Maplecroft, a risk consultancy firm, Mexico occupy the number three in danger of violence just behind 
Afghanistan .  
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This increasing violence generated new ways to approaches the current problem. The exclusive 
use of the army and police force have showed to be no efficient. Therefore, the government started 
to implement programs to address crime and violence through community centers and institutional 
programs like the initiative “Todos Somos Juarez” (We all are Juarez) and “Limpiemos Mexico" 
(Clean up Mexico). This last one included other programs such as "Escuela Segura" (Safe School), 
"Salud solo sin Drogas" (Health only without drugs), and "Recuperacion de Espacios Publicos" 
(Recovery of Public Spaces) (Ramirez de Garay & Diaz Roman, 2017). 
Along those lines the Pillar IV of the Merida Initiative (signed in 2007 by the governments of 
Mexico and the United States) seeks to empower local leaders, civil society representatives, and 
private sector actors to lead crime prevention and drug demand reduction effort in the communities 
(Seelke, 2017). In addition, and as a joint effort, the Government of Enrique Peña Nieto launched 
in 2013 the National Crime and Violence Prevention fund (PRONAPRED). From 2013 to 2016, 
Mexico designated around of $2,099,712,616.94 billion pesos for crime prevention programs; later 
in 20173 no money where designated for this purpose. At the end of the Enrique Peña Nieto’ 
administration, in 2018, the program was relaunched with less money, $280,853,381.92 million 
pesos. 
3 “Alan López, researcher of the Security and Justice Program of Mexico Evaluates, says that they do not know the reasons why 
the Budget of Expenditures of the Federation for Fiscal Year 2017 did not include an amount of money to finance the subsidy to 
PRONAPRED” (Vega, 2018) 
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1.1. Objectives 
Find out if the budget for crime and violence prevention program, PRONAPRED, has helped to 
diminish the Intentional homicide rates in the different municipios (Municipal subdivisions, 
regions), that received the monetary aid. 
1.2. Research question 
1) Had the budget for crime prevention from PRONAPRED fund contributed to reduction of
the intentional homicide rate in the locations in question? 
1.3. Hypothesis 
1) Funding from PRONAPRED has contributed to reducing the intentional homicide rate in
the municipios that received funding. 
The present study is developed in five sections. The first section presents a literature review. The 
second section provides a briefly story about the crime and violence prevention fund, the trends in 
homicides relative to the funds spent by the prevention program PRONAPRED and a list of the 
mistakes made in its design. The third section presents the Methodology and Data description. The 
fourth section addresses the results of the models and the fifth one presents the conclusions. 
4 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Studying the impact of social programs from crime prevention projects and other kind of strategies 
combating violence in any kind of region in Mexico represents a big challenge. This is due to the 
fact that violence and crime are driven by a multidimensional factors. According to Puyana et al. 
(2017),  around 50% of the intentional homicides between 2010 and 2011 were related to drug 
trafficking. The homicides were concentrated mostly in the border area in Mexico and east coast. 
This is explained mainly by the fact that those involved in local drug sales   carry guns for attacking 
or defend oneself from the rivals. (Puyana, et al., 2017) 
Jason M. Lindo and Maria Padilla (2016) measure the impact of kingpin strategy. Using a panel 
data analysis, Fixed Effect method, they estimated the effect of kingpin captures in the homicides 
rate.  They conclude that this strategy (taking down drug lords and important lieutenants), only has 
effect in the municipality where the Cartel boss was captured, and smaller but significant effect in 
the neighboring municipalities. Widner et al. (2011), used also a panel model Fixed Effect method, 
to understand two factors: 1) which crimes are more frequent in the northern area of Mexico and 
which ones in the rest of the country and, 2) which factors drive to more arrests for different types 
of crimes.  Concluding that region with more arrest is the one closer to the United States, drug 
related activities are highly related with those crimes. 
Brown et al. (2017) using Fixed Effect method to longitudinal data, studied the effect of the 
Mexican drug war on risk attitudes, to understand how the individual’s attitude respond to a 
changes in the environment. They found that the exposure of violent environment significantly 
increase risk aversion. Their results, using the Mexican Family Life Survey, show an increase of 
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1 homicide per 10, 000 people, increase by 1.5% to 5% being risk averse (Brown, Montalva, 
Thomas Duncan, & Velasquez, 2017).  
Fergusson and Horwood (2000), measure, using Fixed Effect regression methods, in what extent 
the individual between 15 and 21 years old were involved in violent and property crimes, and in 
what extent they present abuse alcohol symptoms. They found a significant alcohol abuse is 
associated with increases in violence and property robberies. Phillips and Greenberg (2007) 
conducted other study that involves Panel data analysis. They compare the estimations obtained 
by Fixed Effect and Random Effect methods in a data set of homicide rates and a vector of 
explanatory variables for 400 US counties over 15 years. They conclude that, given the data they 
used, neither method holds a significant advantage over the other.  
Greenberg (2014) conducted a time series and a Panel Data analysis with fixed effect method, 
including a vector of explanatory variables, to study the crime in New York city. The study is 
focusing principally on how misdemeanor arrests impact felonies crimes, homicide, robbery and 
aggravated assault. The findings do not show significance or evidence that minor arrest helped to 
reduce felony crime.     
Following the same strategy as Lindo and Padilla (2016), Calderon et. al (2015) used a modern 
statistic methods to understand if the policy to target senior drug cartel member has an impact on 
the dynamic of drug-related violence.  By combining difference-in-difference with synthetic 
control group methods they generated a little different outcome. Taking down or killing drug cartel 
leaders has influenced not only drug related violence, but  the homicides in general (that impacts 
the general population). On the other hand, captures or killing lieutenants seems to increase the 
violence just in strategic municipalities, or areas related to the drug traffic networking.  
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Similarly, Javier Osorio (2015) tried to identify what makes a “municipio” in Mexico more violent 
than others. Applying special econometrics methods to shed some light about the spread of 
violence he found three main things. First, the intensification of the violence in one municipality 
has a significant influence in closer municipalities. Second, the significant number of crime 
organizations in the zone, plus the irruption of the effects of law enforcement are key factors 
increasing the violence by OC. Third, some factors, commonly believed as structural components 
to influence the increasing risk of violence, such as “territorial value, gun availability, international 
drug supply, corruption, education and socioeconomic characteristics play only a limited role” 
(Osorio, 2015).  
Ingram (2018), inquires in the concept of community resilience and if the Merida Initiative has 
had any effect at all on reducing the violence. By applying also statistic special models, he found 
that homicides are not randomly distributed across municipios. Homicides also follow a spatial lag 
effect, suggesting the spread over neighborhood municipios. Educational has a significant impact 
on homicides rates but just on a local level. Economic inactivity has a negative direct effect, but a 
strong positive indirect effect from communities. 
Another study involving schools comes from Jarrillo et. al (2016). Applying Fixed Effect method 
in a Panel data. She studied the effect of drug war affecting attendance in elementary and middle 
school in Mexico.  The results show that a prolonged exposure to turf war has significantly 
negative impact on the achievement of the kids in the school. Localities with higher exposure to 
bloody battles between cartels and army, showed a change in behavior of students and teachers, 
leading to  lower performance in class. Victimization and fear of crime obstruct the supply and 
quality of education, increase the teacher turnover, and reduce attendance to class. 
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Carrasco et al. (2014) conducted a semiparametric difference-in-difference approach to build a 
control group for the municipalities that have received Joint Interventions at municipal level, trying 
to understand the impact on the workers income. They found that in the most violent “municipios” 
there is an increase of low-income workers with respect of the total amount of workers in the area. 
Following the same line Magaloni et al (2015) evaluated the economic implication of the drug war 
in Mexico. Using an exogenous variation of the instrumental variable proposed by Carrasco et al. 
(2014), based on the historical seizure cocaine from Colombia interacted with the distance to the 
northern border area in Mexico and the electricity consumption per household as a proxy variable 
for GDP. They found that the increase in  homicides related to the drug war has a significant impact 
in the people owned business (decrease), and in the unemployment rate (increase). They also 
highlighted that the municipios that face a dramatic increase  in violence between 2007 and 2010 
faced a reduction in in the crime  during 2011. 
Magaloni et al (2017) also studied why some Organized Crime groups adopt some kind of 
extortion in some areas and support some others. Using list experiments, they provided evidence 
that the extortion is more concentrated in areas with more organized crime groups than in ones that 
remain under a control of a single one. Edgardo Buscaglia, in his essay “La Paradoja Mexicana de 
la Delincuencia Organizada” (2012), address the issue that the Government of Mexico only 
implemented 46% of the measures that are included  in the Palermo Convention and just attended 
to only 23% of the Merida Initiative actions. Therefore the scaling of the crime has more to do 
with improper implementation of designed policies. He suggested  the paradoxical statement that 
stricter  law enforcement results in more corruption and more violent response from the OC groups. 
Castillo et. al. (2013) estimates the effect that drug traffic has on increasing the violence in Mexico. 
Using Instrumental Variable regression (IV), they showed that the illegal traffic and the increase 
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of the violence during Felipe Calderon’s administration are related to the success of interventions 
policies in Colombia since 2006. 
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3. THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND
The strategy of the administration of the President Felipe Calderon was mainly based on the direct 
confrontation against the Cartels. However, instead of reducing the violence and the homicides, 
this strategy resulted in even more violence across Mexico. This was the reason why this strategy 
was widely criticized. According to the Mexican press, the administration of Vicente Fox left a 
total chaos in the society in general, and led to increase in the organized crime (Ramirez, 2016). 
On the other hand, it is very likely that Felipe Calderon as well contributed to the escalation of the 
homicides and crime rates in the country. (Ramirez de Garay & Diaz Roman, 2017). To address 
the widespread violence across Mexico, other programs came to play. The Government established 
models that applied interinstitutional approach to crime and violence prevention. This includes 
programs like “Limpiemos Mexico” (Cleaning Mexico), “Escuela Segura” (School safe) and 
“Salud solo sin Drogras” (Healthy without drugs). 
The violence and crime started to concentrate more in the northern states, close to the border with 
the United States of America. Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua, during 2007 and 2011, became the 
most dangerous city in the world (Paniagua, 2016). Between 2008 and 2013, the administration of 
Felipe Calderon increased the budget of the Municipal Security (SUBSEMUN) by 25%. This 
budget was created for the security of the communities, by increasing the amount of funds allocated 
for police equipment. Since 2012, 20% of the SUMSEMUN budget would be designated to crime 
prevention programs (Ramirez de Garay & Diaz Roman, 2017). During this period, different local 
programs were also implemented. The most important one was “Todos Somos Juarez” (We are 
Juarez). 
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At the end of the administration of Felipe Calderon, in 2012, the General Law for Violence and 
Crime Prevention (LGPSVD), got into force. The law defined the crime and violence prevention 
as the set of public policies, programs and actions aimed at reducing risk factors that favor the 
generation of violence and crime, as well as combating the different causes and factors that 
generate it (Hernandez, 2012). In 2007 the Mexican and US Governments signed “Iniciativa 
Merida” (Merida Initiative) to combat crime and bring stability to civil life. 
The Merida Initiative bases its strategy on the following four pillars: 
 Pillar I: Disrupting the Operational Capacity of Organized Crime: Decrease the power of
Mexican organized crime groups by systematically capturing and prosecuting their leaders, 
and reducing the profits of the illicit drug trade through the seizure of narcotics, and the 
brake on money laundering. 
 Pillar II: Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain the Rule of Law and Respect for Human
Rights in Mexico: Improve the capacity of Mexican institutions responsible for public 
security and borders, as well as judicial institutions to maintain the rule of law. 
 Pillar III: Creating a “21st Century Border”: Facilitate legitimate trade and movement of
people while restricting the illicit flow of drugs, people, weapons and cash. 
 Pillar IV: Building Strong and Resilient Communities: Strengthen 
communities/neighborhoods by creating a culture of respect for the laws, decreasing the 
attraction and power of organizations dedicated to drug trafficking by implementing and 
creating work programs, involving young people in their communities, expanding social 
protection networks, and building trust in public institutions within communities. (Los 
Cuatro pilares de la Cooperacion , 2019). 
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The Pillar IV reflects the emerging emphasis on broader cultural, social and economic factors 
underlying violence by empowering local leaders, civil society representatives, and private sector 
actors to lead crime prevention and drug demand reduction efforts in their communities (Seelke, 
2017). The USAID mission in Mexico has helped developing several programs, mostly in 
bordering areas, to address the crime. Since 2012, USAID/Mexico has allocated $70,087,678 
million dollars for crime and violence preventions programs according to Pillar IV of Merida 
Initiative, see table 1, (USAID from the American People, 2019). 
In 2013 the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto, launched the National Crime Prevention 
Program Fund (PRONAPRED). This program tried to involve all the federal dependencies with 
the objective to diminish addictions, transform public spaces, and promote productive projects. In 
order to accomplish such goal, he not just designated one part of the budget for the 2013 fiscal 
year, but also did several modifications to several laws that could interfere in the application of 
the fund.  The National Law of victims and Penal Code were modified in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the Fund. With this actions the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto tried to 
differentiate from its predecessor. 
Activity Title Amount (TEC/TEA) Start Date End Date Municipio
(CVPP) Crime and Violence Prevention Program 17,533,385.00$          2012 2015 NATIONAL/JUAREZ/MONTERREY/ TIJUANA
Music in Human Development for a Culture Free of Violence 200,000.00$       2012 2014 JUAREZ_CH
Youth Pathways Mexico /Jovenes con Rumbo 3,128,568.00$        2012 2015 TIJUANA/MONTERREY
(EJEMPLAR) Youth Violence Prevention Through Audiovisual Media (EJEMPLAR) 1,500,000.00$        2012 2015 MONTERREY
Expanding Children's Development 1,167,521.00$        2012 2015 JUAREZ_CH
Developing National Policy to Promote Wellbeing Among Mexico's Youth 1,482,898.00$        2012 2015 NATIONAL
Expanding Children's Development 450,000.00$       2013 2015 JUAREZ_CH
(ESLV) Experiencia Scout, Listos Para la Vida 2,499,488.00$        2013 2015 TIJUANA
CVPP-II (Extension) 4,799,587.00$        2015 2016 NATIONAL/JUAREZ/MONTERREY/ TIJUANA
(REDSUMARSE) Initiative 2.0 1,071,445.00$        2015 2020 MONTERREY
(DHARTE) Developing Learning Skills Responsibilities to Transform the Environment 1,337,954.00$        2015 2018 MONTERREY
(FUNDMEX) Schools Building Peace in Mexico 2,076,807.00$        2015 2018 MONTERREY
(FUNDMEX) Schools Building Peace in Mexico 2,076,807.00$        2015 2018 TIJUANA
(REINSERTA) Youth without Prison Activity 770,682.00$       2015 2018 MEXICO CITY
(JPV) Together to Prevent Violence 24,465,000.00$          2015 2020 NATIONAL/JUAREZ/MONTERREY/ TIJUANA/CHIHUAHUA
(YBI PHASE 2) Youth Pathways Initiative Phase II (JcR Alliance 2nd Phase) 3,027,536.00$        2016 2019 MONTERREY/Metro-Area/MEXICO CITY/TIJUANA
(CCSJ) Youth in Conflict with the Law 1,000,000.00$        2016 2019 CHIHUAHUA/JUAREZ
(SADEC) Broadening the Development of Children 1,500,000.00$        2016 2020 CHIHUAHUA/JUAREZ
Total 70,087,678.00$          
Table 1.  USAID/Mexico budget 
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In the National Development Plan for 2013, Peña Nieto included the violence prevention as a 
strategy addressing the causes of the same and the treatment of the drivers that conduct to a bad 
social behavior. It also promotes the inclusion of civil social organizations, citizen participation 
and academic sector. The Ministry of Social Prevention (SPyPC), was created with the objective 
of monitoring PRONAPRED and applying the policies on crime prevention. In addition, the lines 
of the implementation or at least the document that determines the activities the budget from 
PRONAPRED would be spend on, will be the National Program for the Social Prevention of 
Violence (PNPSVD).  
We can summarize the goals of the PNPSVD in five points: 1) Increase the participation of the 
citizens and stakeholders in the crime preventions by increasing their capabilities, 2) decreasing 
the danger of the at- risk population, 3) promote the environment that leads to the conflict-free 
behavior and coexistence, 4) strengthen the local institutions at all levels (municipal, state and 
federal), and 5) ensure the horizontal cooperation between institutions (Ramirez de Garay & Diaz 
Roman, 2017).  The Risk Factors internationally taken as common drivers of crime were included 
in the PNPSVD4. The target groups program will be addressing are  children, teenagers, women, 
penitentiary population and immigrants. 
The Social Crime Commission (CIPSVD) was created with the aim of coordinating the federal 
instances. It also Social Crime Commission works with the same target groups and matches with 
some of the goals of the PNPSVD. The CIPSVD supposedly has to select the municipios that  have 
higher levels of crime and show more drivers of crime.5   
4 Teenage pregnancy, school dropouts, family violence, illegal drugs consumption, low social capital and low citizen 
participation, impunity environments, deteriorated public spaces, migration and social exclusion.   
5 According to “Mexico Evalua” this criteria is not clear and ambiguous and apparently was changed trough the 
years.   
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4. WHAT WENT WRONG WITH PRONAPRED
Despite the effort that the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto put to implement PRONAPRED, 
several issues raised since the design until its final application. First issue is the inclusion of the 
international risk factors. According to McAra and Mc Vie (2012), it is very difficult to 
determinate how the risk factors can cause violence. The evaluation of the crime and violence 
drivers are conducted through  costly methods that involve monitoring a sample of people trough 
years (McAra & McVie, 2012). In addition, there is the question whether the internationally 
accepted risk factors can be applied entirely to the context of Mexico. There is no study conducted 
by any public institution or private consultancy company in Mexico that supports the idea that 
these Risk Factors in the PNPSVD can fit in Mexican context. 
Another vague area was the criteria for the selection of the Municipios for PRONAPRED. There 
is no  consistent methodology that tells how the areas of interest were selected. The private 
consultancy “Mexico Evalua6 wrote a report where it tries to understand what guided the selection 
criteria of the municipios.  According to them a group of experts were hired to build a sample of 
210 municipalities, with a population of at least 100,000 inhabitants. From the 210 municipalities, 
a subsample was integrated with 100 possible beneficiary entities. However, "the selection 
mechanism is not clear (...) [and] the information that has been published is insufficient and does not 
allow replication of the selection model to verify that the selection of the demarcations actually 
responds to the problems it seeks to solve" (Mexico Evalua, 2014). 
6 Mexican think thank which analyze and evaluate the processes of improvement of public policies at the federal, 
state and local levels through the generation and / or review of evidence and the formulation of recommendations. 
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There is also a big question about how some of the programs can contribute to crime and violence 
reduction. Mexico Evalua (Mexico Evaluates), in his report of 2014, expressed doubts about 
effectiveness of some approved and implemented measures when it comes to the crime prevention, 
which should be a final goal of those measures. These measures include providing glasses to the 
population as part of the early intervention program for learning and reducing behavioral problems, 
or teaching the women of the area how to cook. . 
Some legal confusion emerged with all the institution in charge of crime prevention. The LGPSVD 
in its article 10 designates the National Council of Public Safety (CNSP) as the Institution in charge 
of proposeing the policies about crime prevention. The National Center for Crime Prevention 
(CNPD), which depends of the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System 
(SESNSP), in its article 20 has the obligation to propose to the CNSP long term strategies for crime 
prevention. The LGPSVD also recognized the CNSP, in its article 12, as the body in charge of the 
crime and violence prevention policies design, thus taking away all legal authorities from SPYPC. 
In addition, many irregularities suggesting corruption or at least absence of transparency in using 
the funds was identified during the application of PRONAPRED. According to Secretariat of the 
Interior (SEGOB), during 2015 and 2016, not all municipios had the second transfer, so one would 
assume they have received all the money at once, although that is not clear as well.  In addition in 
2016 the PRONAPRED funds allocated to Ciudad Juarez misteriously disappeared (Minjares, 
2016), and it is not known whether this kind of incident happened in other municipios included in 
the program. 
Thus, although in the beginning it seemed to be a good way of combatting the crime, however, the 
project did not have proper organization and evaluation plans and lacked good management and 
monitoring. Despite the flaws in program implementation, it is still important to understand the 
15 
effectiveness of PRONAPRED in diminishing violent crime. This analysis will be especially 
valuable for future programs that might address the same issue. In this paper intentional homicides 
rate was taken as  the proxy for violence and crime in the country. 
Intentional homicides statistics, unlike other types of crime, suffer the least form underreporting, 
because corpses are more difficult to ignore than losses of property or assaults (Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, & Loayza, 2000). Therefore, observing the impact of the fund on intentional homicides 
can provide us a with a rather  accurate perspective on whether  the PRONAPRED has 
accomplished its goal. 
Additionally our model takes into consideration socio-economics variables that may be important 
drivers for crime prevention activities: schools attendance  statistics and number of convenience 
stores open in a year. Sociologists and criminologists found out that education can help individuals 
and communities identify and take advantage of opportunities where others may not see them, 
helping people avoid entering into a cycle of delinquency in the first place (Ingram, 2014). We use 
several school control indicators to understand the impact the school attendance may have on  the 
homicide rate. Similar logic applies to the number of stores opened in the neighborhood, the last 
variable  is proposed as a proxy to measure economic activities  in the target cities. 
Communities that are most resilient to homicide appear to be those with strong, local educational 
attainment nested within broader regions or neighborhoods of municipalities that are economically 
developed (Ingram, 2014). 
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4.1. The description of the Intentional Homicides Trend 
The general trend of homicides is available since 1990, when  INEGI started reporting this data. 
During the years 1990 to 2016 homicide rates reached the highest pick  in 1994 with more than 
15,000 homicides reported. Two major events happening during that year were responsible for 
that:  happened; “El error de diciembre” - one severe economic crisis and the emerging of the 
EZLN - far-left libertarian-socialist political and militant group  in Chiapas, the southernmost state 
of Mexico. Since 2007, when the administration of Felipe Calderon declared the war against the 
Organized Crime the homicides start to increase consistently reaching a new highest point in 2011 
with over 25,000 homicides. After that the  decreasing trend is explained by beginning of the 
administration of Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012 See figure in  7 appendix A. 
The figure 1 and 2  show the homicides trend in Mexico during the period 2011 to 2018, by total 
and by each 100, 000 habitants. The chart in the right has a red line to highlight the moment when 
the trend started to decrease. 
In 2011, during the last part of Felipe Calderon administration, Ciudad Juarez was the most violent 
city in Mexico (with 1460 total homicides), followed by Acapulco, Monterrey and Chihuahua City. 
In 2013 when PRONAPRED started, 81 municipios where included in the program to receive 
Figure 1.  Total Intentional Homicides in Mexico Figure 2.  Intentional Homicides Rate in Mexico 
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funding for crime and violence prevention, see table 6 in apendix A. In 2013 the government 
assigned $2´250,000,000.00 pesos in total to be split between all the municipios included in the 
PRONAPRED, however, only  $2,099,712,616.94 pesos was really spent. By 2017 PRONAPRED 
was suspended with no officially provided reason. It is also known that  in the same year the 
administration of Enrique Peña Nieto cut the budget for several programs due to the increase of 
the government debt. In 2018 the program was reopened but with lest budget ($280,853,381.92 
pesos).  See able 2 and figure 3 
From 2011 to 2013 the five most violent municipios at that time where Ciudad Juarez in 
Chihuahua, Acapulco de Juarez in Guerrero, Monterrey in Nuevo Leon, Tijuana in Baja California 
and Ecatepec de Morelos in the Estado de Mexico. However when PRONAPRED was 
Año Asignado Ejercido 
2013 $2,500,000,000.00  $2,099,712,616.94 
2014 $2,595,000,000.00  $2,140,225,769.08 
2015 $2,683,230,000.00  $1,772,561,869.90 
2016 $2,015,311,756.00  $1,458,005,177.66 
2018 $300,000,000.00 $280,853,381.92 
Table 1.  Amount in pesos of the PRONAPRED Fund 
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Figure 3.  PRONAPRED Budget trend 
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implemented in 2013 the trend of the intentional homicides was decreasing. That does not mean 
that the fund does not give an extra “speed” to reaching the lowest point in violence in 2014, but 
we can not infer that the progress was only due to the PRONAPRED activities, since other 
programs with very similar goals were also implemented during the same period of time. 7 
Figure 4.  Change in Homicides 2011-2012 
Figure 5.  Change in Homicides 2012-2013 
For instance, in Ciudad Juarez, the program “Todos Somos Juarez” where implemented since 2010 
until the last day of the administration of Felipe Calderon (2012), along with PRONAPRED and 
7 FASP and SUBSEMUN. 
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SUMBSEMUN, the total amount of money allocated was $5 ,531,365,220.40 m.n 8 (Panigua 
Vazquez & Camargo-Gonzalez, 2017). Despite decline in homicides, in 2016 Juarez could leave 
the list of the 50 most dangerous cities  in the world, the trend started to increase again. However, 
Juarez city deserves an individual analysis; it is interesting to see that the increase in homicides in 
Juarez follows the same  trend as the rest of the  country, despite the numerous programs mentioned 
above( see figure 8 in appendix A). 
One observation is that in 2011, before the funding was applied, the homicides rate in the 
municipios treated under PRONAPRED was higher than in the rest of the country. However, in 
the following years the intentional homicide rates in these municipios declined significantly. 
Although it is true that the PRONAPRED budget was approved and applied in 2013 when the 
trend of homicides was decreasing already. In 2014 more municipios where included in the 
program (Appendix C).. This process was repeated until 2017; some  municipios were included, 
8 $ 437,954,490.92 dollars 
Figure 6.  The trend of Homicides in the target and no target "municipios" 
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meanwhile others left the program. In 2014, the Enrique Peña Nieto administration faced their 
most controversial episode: Ayotzinapa. On September 26, local police from de municipio of 
Iguala in the southern state of Guerrero (one of the most poorest states in Mexico), attacked a 
group of students from the rural teaching college of Ayotzinapa, leaving six people dead in the 
place and 43 missing (Speck, 2019). The young students traveled from the town of Ayotzinapa, 
located in the state of Guerrero  to one of the main schools to train rural teachers from Mexico. 
They intended to take buses to travel to the capital of the country (Mexico City) and participate in 
the annual commemoration march in honor of  1968 student massacre. During the night of the 26 
of September, there was a crossfire between the local police and members of a local drug 
trafficking group against the buses in which the students were traveling. It is not clear why the 
buses with students were selected as the target for the attack (Franco , 2018). 
Instead of coming up with a rapid response the Enrique Peña Nieto administration spent days trying 
to find who can take the responsibility for the attack. This followed the arrests of over 100 people 
in the municipal police. In the beginning the commune statementthat the students were connected 
with Organized Crime, got  quickly denied. During the investigation a several of anomalies started 
to show up. One of those was  the negligence of the federal and local authorities who already knew  
about the disappearances in real time and failed to act (Speck, 2019). 
After this episode, the approval of the President fell sharply. In 2015, the federal government 
started to slash and eventually  eliminated some crime prevention support programs that were a 
burden on the state budget (in 2017 the PRONAPRED fund was suspended). Internationally the 
oil prices plummeted,  forcing Mexican Petroleum (PEMEX) s cut their jobs across Mexico 
(Stargardter, 2018). Needless to say that many industries were affected as well, since Mexico lost 
revenues received from oil export, one of the largest categories of trade. The homicides rate, which 
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reached its lowest point a couple of years ago, started to hike, hitting again the 2011 level and even 
and surpassing it. 
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5. DATA DESCRIPTION
Data for homicides was sourced from SESNSP and National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI). Both sources take into consideration intentional homicides by month and by 
municipality. Observations from 1990 to 2010 where gathered from INEGI, while those from 2011 
to 2018 were obtained from SESNSP. 
The number of new retail stores opened (a proxy variable measuring economics and confidence 
flow in the area), was gathered from INEGI within the scope of the retail store census from 2011 
to 2018. The database lists retail stores by number of employees in increments and categorizes by 
state and municipality. The year of 2015 was interpolated since the census data was showing a 
very big hike for that one year, which was more likely caused by issues in data collection and 
reporting, since no significant differences were observed in the policies and tax regulations that 
could cause the hike.  Stores from “0 to 5” and “6 to 10” employees were aggregated to represent 
small family-run corner stores and convenience shops. This stores represent more than 92% of the 
total number of retail stores opened for the period mentioned above. This proxy variable only 
considers new businesses. We eliminated duplicate businesses, that have records of multiple 
registrations. These duplicates were identified by using geographic coordinates and physical 
addresses provided in the census. 
The school database was provided by Secretary of Public Education (SEP), through National 
Transparency Platform (PNT). The database considers school years from 2010 to 2017 by state 
and municipal level. Three levels of education are including: primaria (elementary school), 
secundaria (middle school), and preparatoria (high school).  Indicators such as drop-out rate, 
gender ratio, and student to teacher ratio were built for each education level. It is important to point 
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out that no distinction of private school and public school were done. Since the “municipals” are 
the unit of interest within this study, the corresponding type of schools were aggregated to that 
level. 
The observations for high school were provided in two different databases. One database was 
exclusively for “bachillerato general”, a subtype of high school intended to prepare students for 
college, from 2010 to 2013. The second database used is the list of “educación media superior” or 
vocational secondary education institutions where  all subtypes of high schools were included from 
2013 to 2017. After reviewing the data, we noticed that the second database includes the first 
database, therefore, in 2013 we face an increasing population for high school level. However, it 
was determined that the data can be combined, since the study is using ratios and proportions rather 
than the absolute values of student population.  
The dropout rates were built using total enrollment for each year per school and the total number 
of students enrolled in the following year per school. By using lag variables, groups of students 
were tracked through each grade level. The difference between the following year enrollment and 
the lag variable was divided by the total enrollment for that school. This dropout rate per school 
and by year was aggregated at the municipal level. 
Gender ratios were derived from total enrollment of boys by school divided by total enrollment of 
girls by school for each year, ratios were aggregated by municipality. Student to teacher ratios 
followed the same logic in which total student enrollments by school is divided by total faculty in 
each school and aggregated by municipality. 
For the population database we considered the years from 2011 to 2018. The observations were 
gathered from two sources. From INEGI we used “La Encuesta Nacional de Población y Vivienda” 
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and “Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda”. From the State Committee of Statistical and 
Geographic Information (CEIEG), we used “Conteos Estatales de Población y Vivienda”. The 
dummy indicator variable for PRONAPRED was collected from SEGOB, through the PNT. The 
variable reflects the location (municipios/states) and starting day (dates when the money was 
deposited to the specific municipio) from 2013 to 2016 and 2018. 
5.1. Data Limitations 
We aware that each analysis or study face several limitations. The most common one is always the 
lack of data. This study faced the same problem especially in trying to get data for long periods at 
municipio level. We know that information that is more detailed would allow us to get more 
accurate results. However official data on social and economic indicators in Mexico is not reported 
at the municipal level. Another  issue is absence of data for some  years for different cities. 
However, a substantial effort was made in finding observations that can be significant for a crime 
prevention analysis. 
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6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In order to assess whether the budget for crime and violence prevention in the communities in 
question had some effect on reduction of the intentional homicide rate, we have used  the Fixed 
Effects regression (FE) method to estimate such effect using panel data. The FE is a regression 
estimation method for controlling for omitted variables in panel data when the omitted variables 
vary across entities (cities), but do not change over time. It can be used when there are two or more 
time observations for each city (Stock & Watson, 2011). 
6.1. Tests for Fixed Effect method for Panel Data 
The two most commonly used statistical tools for the panel data analysis are  Fixed Effect and 
Random Effect methods. In addition the data needs to be tested for the absence of the 
autocorrelation between the variables. In order to know which method is more appropriate to use 
the following tests were performed: The Hausman specification test and The Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data. 
6.2. Random Effects Regression vs. Fixed Effects Regression 
In order to know with method is better for the current analysis we performed The Hausman 
specification test (1978). This test is commonly used to determine which panel data method is 
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more appropriate to use (see appendix B). Fixed Effect method is frequently used to explore the 
relationship between predictor and outcome variables within entity and to analyze the impact of 
variables that vary over time. On the other hand, in Random Effect method, the variation across 
entities is assumed unrelated with the independent variables. For the present characteristics of the 
databases using for this study we cannot assume the observations are independent across time. 
Unobserved factors that affect a city’s total crime in one year can affect the city’s total crime four 
years later. The Fixed Effect estimator is more robust to selection bias problems than the Random 
Effects estimator  because if the intercepts incorporate selection characteristics they are controlled 
for the Fixed Effect method (Kennedy, 2003). For these reasons and based on the output of the test 
performed on this study, we use the Fixed Effect method for panel data regression. 
6.3. Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
Because serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the standard errors and causes the 
results to be less efficient, a  test discussed by Wooldridge (2002) was performed using STATA 
built-in test  (Drukker, 2003). The test for serial correlation and Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data (V. Wiggins and B.Poi, using STATA 15), accounts for  similarity of values separated 
from each other by a given time lag. The result of the test show that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation in the model. 
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7. THE MODEL
The Fixed Effect estimator has separate intercepts, one for each city. These intercepts can be 
represented by a set of binary (or indicator) variables. These binary variables absorb the influences 
of all omitted variables that differ from one entity to the next, but are constant over time (Stock & 
Watson, 2011).  
In order to estimate the impact of the crime and violence prevention in the intentional homicide 
rate in cities in question since 1990 we propose the following general model. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝐷𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the intentional homicide rate,  𝑖 =1,..,n, and 𝑡 =1990,…,2018,. Fixed effects for each 
municipality are given by 𝛼𝑖. 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the indicator variable for the start of PRONAPRED funding 
by location and time,  where 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛 and 𝑡 = 1990, . . . , 2018, and 𝜆𝑡 is the time fixed effect. 
To evaluate the general model above, two robustness models will be estimated. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the homicide rate,   𝑖 =1,..,n, and 𝑡 =2010,…,2018, for all the variables.  𝛽𝑖 is the 
unknown coefficient for the different socioeconomics indicators,  𝑋𝑖  is the set of socio-economic 
indicators that stand for number of convenience stores open, school enrollment and school 
dropouts, 𝛼𝑖 is the entity fixed effect, 𝜆𝑡 is the time fixed effect, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
For the second robustness check, we are going to estimate a “Before and After” comparison model 
for two years, 2017 and 2018. This check will be done when data for each city are obtained for 2 
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time periods, i.e., where it is possible to compare values of the dependent variable in the second 
period to values in the first period (Stock & Watson, 2011). 
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8. RESULTS
First, we estimated the general model with the homicides rate trend from 1990 to 2018.  
   Table 2.  Impact of PRONAPRED on Homicide Rate (per 100,00 habitants) 
(1) 
pron_dummy 0.007*** 
(0.000) 
_cons 0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Obs. 63307 
R-squared 0.059 
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We use the parameter 𝛾 as the parameter of PRONAPRED fund, following this pron_dummy =1 
if the muncipios receive PRONAPRED and pron_dummy =0 if the municpio does not receive it. 
We aware that this formulation has little to offer. Nevertheless, we can have some conclusion for 
the current results. If we observe the general trend of total homicides, the big spikes were 
generated in transition periods. The coefficient suggests that being part of the PRONAPRED 
fund, will increase the homicide rate by 0.007. It seems counterintuitive, due to the fact that we 
would expect a negative coefficient, which simply would imply that if the city received 
PRONAPRED funding for decreasing the crime and violence, the homicides rates would have to 
decline.  However, we need to make  several observations. First, between 34% and 57% of all 
homicides in Mexico  from 2006-2017 held characteristics of being  committed by Organized 
Crime (Calderon, Rodriguez Ferreira, & Shirk, 2018). However PRONAPRED goal is not 
precisely addressing this specific type of homicides, but the homicides in general. Second, the 
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average age of the victims of the Organized Crime style murders is 33 years old, which seems to 
contradict the common acceptance “that organized crime violence involves uneducated, 
unemployed, and disaffected youth” (Calderon, Rodriguez Ferreira, & Shirk, 2018). Finally the 
strategy followed by Felipe Calderon administration, generated internal fights between “Cartels” 
for the control of the territories and inside the organizations for the lead of the crime groups, 
which in turn pushes up the homicide rates. 
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Table 3 Impact of the PRONAPRED fund on Total Homicides 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11) 
 PRONAPRED -24.984*** -24.965*** -24.966*** -25.002*** -24.999*** -24.960*** -24.959*** -30.706*** -30.715*** -30.356*** -36.109*** 
(1.343) (1.343) (1.343) (1.344) (1.347) (1.349) (1.349) (1.660) (1.661) (1.662) (3.428) 
 DropoutElem -6.638 -6.616 -5.926 -6.505 -6.488 -6.491 -9.941 -9.847 -9.360 -130.722** 
(5.468) (5.468) (5.548) (6.092) (6.093) (6.093) (9.043) (9.052) (9.044) (65.340) 
 StuTeachElem -0.498 -0.517 -0.512 -0.526 -0.529 -0.363 -0.322 -0.332 0.224 
(1.624) (1.624) (1.664) (1.665) (1.665) (2.283) (2.288) (2.286) (11.152) 
 ElemBoysGirls -0.108 -0.107 -0.109 -0.109 -0.033 -0.028 -0.040 1.177 
(0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187) (0.819) 
 DropoutMidd -0.406 -0.068 -0.070 -1.558 -1.684 -1.378 -1.294 
(4.427) (4.456) (4.456) (7.966) (7.992) (7.985) (66.444) 
 StuTeachMidd -0.074 -0.073 -0.065 -0.064 -0.073 -1.288 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.789) 
 MiddBoyGirls 0.120 0.332 0.324 0.093 1.041 
(0.831) (1.244) (1.245) (1.245) (6.744) 
 DropoutHigh -0.786 -0.749 -0.559 4.810 
(2.507) (2.528) (2.526) (9.862) 
 StuTeachHigh -0.010 -0.009 -0.071 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.068) 
 HighBoysGirls -2.599*** -4.284*** 
(0.662) (1.541) 
 Stores 0.232*** 
(0.037) 
 _cons 11.243*** 11.165*** 11.732*** 13.935*** 13.974*** 15.240*** 15.102*** 13.747** 13.786** 17.288*** 26.426 
(0.165) (0.177) (1.856) (3.520) (3.569) (4.046) (4.157) (5.457) (5.464) (5.531) (25.854) 
 Obs. 11864 11864 11864 11864 11782 11782 11782 9399 9392 9392 2890 
 R-squared  0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.045 0.045 0.047 0.072 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Because the first general regression model covers more years of homicides (from 1990-2018), but 
does not have any controls for the variable of interest (PRONAPRED fund), we estimated the 
second model, adding more controls to the estimation and narrowing the years. The second model 
consists of  several estimations for 11 variables. It adds one more control variable in each next 
estimation. Therefore, in the column 11 of the table 4, we have a complete model with the variable 
of interest and all the control variables proposed for this analysis. 
In the column 1, we estimated the effect of the dummy variable PRONAPRED on the homicide 
rate. According with our results, being part of the PRONAPRED funding reduces number of total 
homicides by. In the second column, we add the first control variable: dropouts for Elementary 
School.  The main intention of adding control variable in each estimation is to hold constant factors 
that, if neglected, could lead the estimation of the variable of interest to suffer from omitted 
variables (Stock & Watson, 2011). 
The variable of interest, in the second estimation remains at the same level of significance. Here 
we control for the class size in elementary school. The elementary school represents the formative 
years, and the teachers can be a major influencing factor in child moral development. Some 
funding by PRONAPRED eventually improved school performance (Mexico Evalua, 2014). The 
results of our model show that inclusion of this new variable does not substantially change any 
conclusions about homicide rate in the municipios that receive PRONAPRED versus those that do 
not receive. 
The third control variable is the boys to girl’s ratio in elementary school. This variable is indirect 
indicator of dropouts by gender.  Higher numbers indicate more boys than girls are enrolled in the 
school. A higher proportion of girls in each class lowers the level of classroom disruption and 
violence, and seems to improve inter-student and teacher-student relationships (Lavy & Schlosser, 
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2011). It also  has a positive and significant effect on the academic achievements of girls and boys. 
As this ratio increases we observe small decline in the variable of interest It is worth to mention 
that this variable has high significance. 
For column 4, 5 and 6, we add middle schools indicators also as control variables. So we have 
middle school dropouts, student teacher ratio and the proportion of boys to girls. None of this 
variables is significant so the inclusion if these new control variables does not change the total 
homicides depending on the inclusion of the municipio in the PRONAPRED. 
The next three control variables added are indicators for High School. In the column 10, the boys 
to girls ratio is significant and it shows that the increase in ratio of boys to girls by one unit will 
decrease the total homicides by 2.59.  The average age in high school is 17. This age represents a 
high risk of joining a local gang and/or becoming a local drug dealer. So the coefficient shows that 
if the high school age boys stay at school the intentional homicides do decrease.. 
The last column show the inclusion of all the control variables. The last raw accounts for new open 
retail stores. This variable was proposed as a proxy for economic activity. The addition of the store 
variable increases the effect of the coefficient of PRONAPRED, keeping the significance of the 
indicator.  However, surprisingly the sign of the stores’ coefficient is positive. One possible 
explanation is considering extortion as a cause of the homicides. This activity is highly related 
with Organized Crime that can result in homicide and robbery in stores. We also think that a 
positive coefficient indicates that despite the crime in the neighborhood, the people keep open 
stores because that is the primary source of their income. So on one hand one could rather argue 
that the increasing number of small stores is an indicator of absence of employment elsewhere. In 
any case, more studies need to be conducted on this topic. 
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The other surprising outcome is the coefficient of dropouts in elementary schools become 
significant. Apparently, an increase in dropouts increases the total homicides by 130. A number of 
recent studies have examined the relationship between schools and violence in Mexico. However, 
they analyze the implications of crime and violence on outcome performance among other 
indicators (Orraca Romano, 2015). Therefore, we might face a reverse causality. According to 
Katz (2006) reverse causality is the notion that association between X and Y is really because Y 
causes X, but not the other way around. Therefore, homicides are causing kids leave school. 
Following Katz, sometimes identifying this issue is a matter of common sense. However, for the 
current regression is more important to explore the role of dropouts as a control variable, rather 
than an explicative one. (Katz, 2006). 
Table 4.  Impact of PRONAPRED on the Differences 
 in Homicides (Ht-Ht-1). 
(1) 
PRONAPRED -32.274*** 
(2.684) 
_cons 0.929*** 
(0.319) 
Obs. 14257 
R-squared 0.012 
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In the above table, we estimated an “error correction” term, interpreted as reflecting disequilibrium 
responses. The terminology can be explained as follows: if the error in Y grows to quickly, the last 
term becomes bigger, and since its coefficient is negative ( β < 1 for stationarity), ΔΥ is reduced, 
correcting this error. The coefficient of the dummy variable is significant and shows the difference 
in homicides between the municipios with PRONAPRED and the municipios with no 
PRONAPRED. 
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Table 5.  Impact of the interaction term on the 
Differences in Homicides (Ht-Ht-1) 
  (1) 
  (Ht-Ht-1) 
 pd13 -54.542*** 
(4.829) 
 pd14 -52.157*** 
(4.371) 
 pd15 -22.814*** 
(4.229) 
 pd16 -14.301*** 
(4.156) 
 pd18 -23.256*** 
(5.651) 
 _cons 0.948*** 
(0.318) 
 Obs. 14257 
 R-squared 0.019 
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
In addition, we estimated an interaction term on the difference in homicides. This interaction term 
allows the year effect on the Municipios PRONAPRED. Depending on the year, the coefficient is 
diminishing. This can be related with the diminishing of the budget of the fund. However, in 2018 
the fund was re-launched with wade less amount of money than before, nevertheless the coefficient 
still significant. So, it may be other factors that we are not taking account that are highly related 
with the trend of the homicides.    
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9. CONCLUSIONS
Generalized opinion among journalist and academics in Mexico states that PRONAPRED does 
not work despite it being a good alternative to the military strategy. Two main academic studies 
citied above agree that PRONAPRED is just good intentions with no impact. We cannot deny the 
veracity of those studies, given the fact that there existed several problems and failures during the 
implementation of the program.  However, with the present model, given the data for the years we 
noticed two significant facts. First, the PRONAPRED variable is significant in each regression 
estimated for the most robust model with 10 control variables. Second, according to the figure 6, 
the municipios with PRONAPRED are better off than the ones that were not included in the 
project. However, it is fair to mention that this study does not take in consideration other programs 
for crime prevention such as the FASP and SUMSEMUN/FORTASEG, that are not crime and 
violence prevention programs per se, but they designate a sizable percentage of their budget for 
crime prevention.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Intentional Homicides Rates for Ciudad Juarez 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Mexico Total Homicides from 1990 to 2018 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Hausman (1978) specification test  
     Coef. 
 Chi-square test value 392.418 
 P-value 0 
 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     345) =     14.700 
           Prob > F =      0.0001 
 
 
Summary Description Statistics  
     N   Mean   St.Dev   min   max 
Homicides 11864 10.491 41.128 0 1618 
PRONAPRED 19651 .02 .14 0 1 
DropoutElem 19651 -.012 .057 -4.52 .816 
ElemBoysGirls 19651 1.138 .195 .308 7 
StuTeachElem 19651 19.761 5.704 2.8 391 
DropoutMidd 16892 -.043 .066 -3.364 .607 
StuTeachMidd 16892 15.818 4.436 1 66.38 
MiddBoyGirls 16890 1.126 .28 0 12.079 
DropoutHigh 12621 -.12 .097 -2.4 .667 
StuTeachHigh 12610 22.271 20.156 1.4 496 
HighBoysGirls 12621 1.071 .399 .122 18.567 
Stores 3903 15.198 37.367 1 555 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Table 6 Variables Description  
Variable  Description Value Definition 
Homicides  Total number of intentional homicides per year Number 
Homicides Rate Intentional homicide, rate per 100,000 population Ratio 
Stores 
Total number of new convenience stores opened per 
year 
Number 
PRONAPRED 
Dummy variable of the crime and violence 
prevention fund 
Yes/No 
DropoutElem 
Total number of drop-outs from primary schools per 
year in a given municipal 
Ratio 
StuTeachElem  
Proportion of students to teachers in elementary 
school per year in a given municipal 
Ratio 
ElemBoysGirls 
Proportion of boys to girls enrolled in primary 
school per year in a given municipal  
Ratio  
DropoutMidd 
Total number of drop-outs from middle school per 
year in a given municipal  
Number 
StuTeachMidd 
Proportion of students to teachers in middle school 
per year in a given municipal  
Ratio  
MiddBoyGirls 
Proportion of boys to girls enrolled in middle school 
per year in a given municipal  
Ratio  
DropoutHigh 
Total number of drop-outs from high schools per 
year in a given municipal  
Number 
StuTeachHigh 
Proportion of students to teachers in high school per 
year in a given municipal  
Ratio 
HighBoysGirls 
Proportion of boys to girls enrolled in high school 
per year in a given municipal  
Ratio 
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APPENDIX D 
CLAVE ENTIDAD CLAVE MUNICIPIO CLAVE MUNICIPIO CLAVE MUNICIPIO CLAVE MUNICIPIO CLAVE MUNICIPIO
001 Aguascalientes 001 Aguascalientes 001 Aguascalientes 001 Aguascalientes 001 Aguascalientes
005 Jesús María
002 Mexicali 002 Mexicali 002 Mexicali 002 Mexicali 002 Mexicali
004 Tijuana 004 Tijuana 004 Tijuana 004 Tijuana 004 Tijuana
003 La Paz 003 La Paz 003 La Paz 003 La Paz 008 La Paz
003 Los Cabos
002 Campeche 002 Campeche 002 Campeche 002 Campeche 003 Carmen
003 Carmen 003 Carmen 003 Carmen 003 Carmen 002 Campeche
017 Matamoros 017 Matamoros 017 Matamoros 017 Matamoros
030 Saltillo 030 Saltillo 030 Saltillo 030 Saltillo 030 Saltillo
035 Torreón 035 Torreón 035 Torreón 035 Torreón 035 Torreón
002 Acuña 002 Acuña
002 Colima 002 Colima 002 Colima 002 Colima
007 Manzanillo 007 Manzanillo 007 Manzanillo 007 Manzanillo 007 Manzanillo
009 Tecomán 009 Tecomán 009 Tecomán 009 Tecomán
089 Tapachula 089 Tapachula 089 Tapachula 089 Tapachula 089 Tapachula
101 Tuxtla Gutiérrez 101 Tuxtla Gutiérrez 101 Tuxtla Gutiérrez 101 Tuxtla Gutiérrez 101 Tuxtla Gutiérrez
019 Comitán de Domínguez
019 Chihuahua 019 Chihuahua 019 Chihuahua 019 Chihuahua 019 Chihuahua
029 Guadalupe y Calvo 029 Guadalupe y Calvo 029 Guadalupe y Calvo
032 Hidalgo del Parral 032 Hidalgo del Parral 032 Hidalgo del Parral
037 Juárez 037 Juárez 037 Juárez 037 Juárez 037 Juárez
010 Álvaro Obregón 010 Álvaro Obregón 010 Álvaro Obregón
015 Cuauhtémoc 015 Cuauhtémoc 015 Cuauhtémoc
005 Gustavo A. Madero 005 Gustavo A. Madero 005 Gustavo A. Madero 005 Gustavo A. Madero 005 Gustavo A. Madero
007 Iztapalapa 007 Iztapalapa 007 Iztapalapa 007 Iztapalapa 007 Iztapalapa
017 Venustiano Carranza 017 Venustiano Carranza 017 Venustiano Carranza
005 Durango 005 Durango 005 Durango 005 Durango 005 Durango
007 Gómez Palacio 007 Gómez Palacio 007 Gómez Palacio 007 Gómez Palacio 007 Gómez Palacio
012 Lerdo 012 Lerdo 012 Lerdo 012 Lerdo
007 Celaya 007 Celaya 007 Celaya 007 Celaya 007 Celaya
015 Guanajuato 015 Guanajuato 015 Guanajuato
020 León 020 León 020 León 020 León 020 León
033 San Luis de la Paz
001 Acapulco de Juárez 001 Acapulco de Juárez 001 Acapulco de Juárez 001 Acapulco de Juárez 001 Acapulco de Juárez
029 Chilpancingo de los Bravo 029 Chilpancingo de los Bravo 029 Chilpancingo de los Bravo 029 Chilpancingo de los Bravo 029 Chilpancingo de los Bravo
038 Zihuatanejo de Azueta 038 Zihuatanejo de Azueta 038 Zihuatanejo de Azueta 038 Zihuatanejo de Azueta
035 Iguala de la Independencia 035 Iguala de la Independencia
017 Cocula 017 Cocula
028 Chilapa de Álvarez 028 Chilapa de Álvarez
021 Coyuca de Benítez
048 Pachuca de Soto 048 Pachuca de Soto 048 Pachuca de Soto 048 Pachuca de Soto 048 Pachuca de Soto
077 Tulancingo de Bravo 077 Tulancingo de Bravo 077 Tulancingo de Bravo 077 Tulancingo de Bravo 077 Tulancingo de Bravo
076 Tula de Allende 076 Tula de Allende
039 Guadalajara 039 Guadalajara 039 Guadalajara 039 Guadalajara 039 Guadalajara
070 El Salto 070 El Salto 070 El Salto 070 El Salto
097 Tlajomulco de Zúñiga 097 Tlajomulco de Zúñiga 097 Tlajomulco de Zúñiga 097 Tlajomulco de Zúñiga
098 San Pedro Tlaquepaque 098 San Pedro Tlaquepaque 098 San Pedro Tlaquepaque 098 San Pedro Tlaquepaque
101 Tonalá 101 Tonalá 101 Tonalá 101 Tonalá
120 Zapopan 120 Zapopan 120 Zapopan 120 Zapopan 120 Zapopan
033 Ecatepec de Morelos 033 Ecatepec de Morelos 033 Ecatepec de Morelos 033 Ecatepec de Morelos 033 Ecatepec de Morelos
058 Nezahualcóyotl 058 Nezahualcóyotl 058 Nezahualcóyotl 058 Nezahualcóyotl
106 Toluca 106 Toluca 106 Toluca 106 Toluca 106 Toluca
054 Metepec 054 Metepec
025 Chalco
006 Apatzingán 006 Apatzingán 006 Apatzingán
052 Lázaro Cárdenas 052 Lázaro Cárdenas 052 Lázaro Cárdenas
053 Morelia 053 Morelia 053 Morelia 053 Morelia 053 Morelia
102 Uruapan 102 Uruapan 102 Uruapan 102 Uruapan 102 Uruapan
108 Zamora
006 Cuautla 006 Cuautla 006 Cuautla 006 Cuautla 006 Cuautla
007 Cuernavaca 007 Cuernavaca 007 Cuernavaca 007 Cuernavaca
011 Jiutepec 011 Jiutepec 011 Jiutepec 011 Jiutepec
018 Temixco 018 Temixco 018 Temixco 018 Temixco 018 Temixco
017 Tepic 017 Tepic 017 Tepic 017 Tepic 017 Tepic
020 Bahía de Banderas
006 Apodaca 006 Apodaca 006 Apodaca 006 Apodaca
009 Cadereyta Jiménez 009 Cadereyta Jiménez 009 Cadereyta Jiménez 009 Cadereyta Jiménez
021 General Escobedo 021 General Escobedo 021 General Escobedo 021 General Escobedo
018 García 018 García 018 García 018 García
026 Guadalupe 026 Guadalupe 026 Guadalupe 026 Guadalupe
031 Juárez 031 Juárez 031 Juárez 031 Juárez 031 Juárez
039 Monterrey 039 Monterrey 039 Monterrey 039 Monterrey 039 Monterrey
040 Páras 040 Páras
046 San Nicolás de los Garza 046 San Nicolás de los Garza 046 San Nicolás de los Garza 046 San Nicolás de los Garza
019 San Pedro Garza García 019 San Pedro Garza García 019 San Pedro Garza García 019 San Pedro Garza García
048 Santa Catarina 048 Santa Catarina 048 Santa Catarina 048 Santa Catarina
049 Santiago 049 Santiago 049 Santiago 049 Santiago
067 Oaxáca de Juárez 067 Oaxáca de Juárez 067 Oaxáca de Juárez 067 Oaxáca de Juárez 067 Oaxáca de Juárez
157 San Jacinto Amilpas 157 San Jacinto Amilpas
184 San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec 184 San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec 184 San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec 184 San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec 184 San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec
390 Santa Lucía del Camino 390 Santa Lucía del Camino
114 Puebla 114 Puebla 114 Puebla 114 Puebla 114 Puebla
156 Tehuacán 156 Tehuacán 156 Tehuacán 156 Tehuacán 156 Tehuacán
019 Atlixco
006 Corregidora 006 Corregidora 006 Corregidora 006 Corregidora
011 El Marqués 011 El Marqués 011 El Marqués 011 El Marqués
008 Huimilpan 008 Huimilpan 008 Huimilpan 008 Huimilpan
014 Querétaro 014 Querétaro 014 Querétaro 014 Querétaro
--- Proyecto Metropolitano --- Proyecto Metropolitano
005 Benito Juárez 005 Benito Juárez 005 Benito Juárez 005 Benito Juárez 005 Benito Juárez
004 Othón P. Blanco 004 Othón P. Blanco 004 Othón P. Blanco 004 Othón P. Blanco
008 Solidaridad 008 Solidaridad 008 Solidaridad 008 Solidaridad
013 Ciudad Valles 013 Ciudad Valles 013 Ciudad Valles 013 Ciudad Valles 013 Ciudad Valles
028 San Luis Potosí 028 San Luis Potosí 028 San Luis Potosí 028 San Luis Potosí 028 San Luis Potosí
001 Ahome 001 Ahome 001 Ahome 001 Ahome 006 Culiacán
006 Culiacán 006 Culiacán 006 Culiacán 006 Culiacán 001 Ahome
015 Salvador Alvarado 015 Salvador Alvarado
018 Cajeme 018 Cajeme 018 Cajeme 018 Cajeme 030 Hermosillo
030 Hermosillo 030 Hermosillo 030 Hermosillo 030 Hermosillo 018 Cajeme
055 San Luis Río Colorado 055 San Luis Río Colorado
029 Guaymas
004 Centro 004 Centro 004 Centro 004 Centro 004 Centro
002 Cárdenas 002 Cárdenas
006 Cunduacán 006 Cunduacán
027 Nuevo Laredo 027 Nuevo Laredo 027 Nuevo Laredo 027 Nuevo Laredo 027 Nuevo Laredo
041 Victoria 041 Victoria 041 Victoria 041 Victoria
032 Reynosa 032 Reynosa 032 Reynosa 032 Reynosa
038 Tampico 038 Tampico
022 Matamoros 022 Matamoros
033 Rio Bravo
006 Calpulalpan 006 Calpulalpan 006 Calpulalpan 013 Huamantla
033 Tlaxcala 033 Tlaxcala 033 Tlaxcala 033 Tlaxcala 033 Tlaxcala
028 Boca del Río 028 Boca del Río 028 Boca del Río 028 Boca del Río
193 Veracruz 193 Veracruz 193 Veracruz 193 Veracruz 193 Veracruz
087 Xalapa 087 Xalapa 087 Xalapa 087 Xalapa 087 Xalapa
108 Minatitlán
31 Yucatán 050 Mérida 050 Mérida 050 Mérida 050 Mérida
010 Fresnillo 010 Fresnillo 010 Fresnillo 010 Fresnillo 010 Fresnillo
017 Guadalupe 017 Guadalupe 017 Guadalupe 017 Guadalupe 017 Guadalupe
056 Zacatecas 056 Zacatecas 056 Zacatecas 056 Zacatecas
14 Jalisco
13 Hidalgo
09 Ciudad de México
10 Durango
11 Guanajuato
12 Guerrero
29 Tlaxcala
30 Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave
25 Sinaloa
Tamaulipas28
2016
07 Chiapas
08 Chihuahua
2013 2014 2015
02 Baja California
06 Colima
04 Campeche
05 Coahuila de Zaragoza
20 Oaxaca
15 México
19 Nuevo León
16 Michoacán de Ocampo
17 Morelos
Querétaro
23 Quintana Roo
22
21 Puebla
MUNICIPIOS PRONAPRED 2013-2016, 2018
24 San Luis Potosí
32 Zacatecas
2018
01 Aguascalientes
Baja California Sur03
18 Nayarit
26 Sonora
27 Tabasco
Table 7 Municipios PRONAPRED 
